The self-specificity of the incidental self-reference effect

Kyungmi Kim and Stephen C. Philipps

Department of Psychology, Wesleyan University

July 2026
Manuscript accepted for publication in *Memory*

Keywords: self-reference effect, self-relevance, familiarity, self, memory

Corresponding author:
Kyungmi Kim
Department of Psychology
Wesleyan University
207 High Street
Middletown, CT 06459
kkim01@wesleyan.edu

Author note:
The work on which this report is based was presented at the Psychonomic Society's 65th Annual Meeting in 2024 in New York City, New York, USA. We thank research assistants in the Memory, Cognition, and Self (MCS) Lab at Wesleyan University for their help with data collection and helpful discussions. All data have been made publicly available via the Open Science Framework and can be accessed at https://osf.io/qbpu3/.

Abstract

The incidental self-reference effect (iSRE) refers to enhanced memory for items co-presented with a self- vs. other-relevant cue when the self/other-relevance of the cues is irrelevant to a given task. Previous iSRE studies confounded self-specificity with familiarity by contrasting highly familiar, self-specific cues (e.g., one’s own name) with less familiar, non-self cues (e.g., a celebrity’s name). The present study sought to disentangle these factors by introducing a highly familiar close other (best friend) as an additional referent. During encoding, participants judged the spatial location of words presented with the name of the self, a close other, or a stranger. They then completed a surprise recognition test and rated each referent’s familiarity and self-relevance. Memory was better for words paired with the self than for those paired with a close other, which were in turn better remembered than words paired with a stranger. Participants rated close-other referents as equally familiar as, but less self-relevant than, the self. These findings suggest that self-specificity, or more broadly self-relevance, rather than familiarity, critically drives the iSRE.

The self-specificity of the incidental self-reference effect

The self-reference effect (SRE; Rogers et al., 1977) refers to a memory advantage for information encoded in a self-relevant vs. non-self-relevant manner (e.g., in relation to another person or semantically; for review, see Symons & Johnson, 1997). The SRE is typically demonstrated using encoding tasks that require participants to evaluate some but not other stimuli in explicit reference to themselves (e.g., "*Does 'reliable' describe you [a celebrity]*?"; Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Keenan et al., 1992; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979). Because this form of the SRE arises from tasks that require self-evaluation/reflection to judge stimuli's self-relevancy, it is sometimes referred to as the *evaluative* SRE (eSRE). The eSRE is attributed to enhanced elaboration and organization of incoming information as new material is integrated with an extensive network of semantic and episodic self-knowledge (Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997).

In addition to the eSRE, studies have shown that even minimal, incidental associations between the self and stimuli can produce an SRE in the absence of evaluative or explicitly self-referential encoding (Cloutier & Macrae, 2008; Cunningham et al., 2008; Turk et al., 2008). For example, in Turk et al. (2008), personality-trait words were presented above or below the participant's own or a celebrity's name or face (i.e., self-cue or other-cue), and participants judged whether each word described the person denoted by the cue (evaluative encoding) or whether the word appeared above the cue (incidental encoding). A subsequent memory test revealed an SRE not only in the evaluative encoding condition (i.e., the eSRE) but also in the incidental encoding condition: words paired with self-cues were better remembered than those paired with other-cues. This latter form of the SRE arising from self-stimuli associations formed in a non-evaluative, non-self-referential task context is referred to as the incidental SRE (iSRE). Although relatively little research has examined the mechanisms underlying the iSRE, it is generally thought to be driven by preferential attentional responses to self-relevant vs. other-relevant information (e.g., Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bargh, 1982; Gray et al., 2004; Moray, 1959; Shapiro et al., 1997; but see Amodeo et al., 2023; Gronau et al., 2003; Kawahara & Yamada, 2004), which in turn enhance encoding of stimuli appearing in close spatiotemporal proximity to a self-relevant cue (Cunningham et al., 2014; Hutchison et al., 2021; Turk et al., 2008). Recent work has also identified important boundary conditions of the iSRE, demonstrating that it depends on conscious, concurrent processing of the self-relevant cue and stimuli (Kim et al., 2018, 2019) and on the availability of sufficient attentional resources at encoding (Wong et al., 2024).

The iSRE has been reliably replicated across studies with both adults and children, not only in memory for the to-be-remembered items themselves (i.e., item memory) but also in memory for contextual details associated with those items (i.e., source memory; e.g., Andrews et al., 2020; Cunningham et al., 2014; Hutchison et al., 2021; Kim et al., 2018, 2019; Ross et al., 2020). Notably, however, previous iSRE studies have exclusively contrasted highly familiar, self-specific cues (e.g., one's own name or face) with less familiar, non-self cues, such as the name or face of a celebrity (e.g., Kim et al., 2018, 2019; Turk et al., 2008) or an unfamiliar, fictitious other (e.g., *"Sam"*; Andrews et al., 2020; Cunningham et al., 2014; Hutchison et al., 2021; Ross et al., 2020). This confound makes it difficult to conclusively determine whether the iSRE is driven by the 'selfness' per se or merely by the heightened familiarity of self-cues.

The question of whether self-processing advantages reflect genuine self-specificity or merely heightened familiarity with self-relevant stimuli has received considerable attention across multiple domains of self-processing research. Perhaps the most compelling evidence for self-specificity comes from the self-prioritization effect (SPE) paradigm (Sui et al., 2012), in which self-relevance is established through arbitrary, experimentally induced associations between geometric shapes and referential labels (e.g., "you," "friend," "stranger"). Because participants learn these associations within the experiment itself, pre-experimental familiarity differences between self- and other-relevant stimuli are eliminated. Using this paradigm, numerous studies have demonstrated robust perceptual matching advantages for self-associated stimuli, providing compelling evidence that self-prioritization in perceptual processing reflects genuine self-specificity rather than familiarity (e.g., Golubickis et al., 2020; Sui et al., 2013, 2015; Woźniak & Knoblich, 2019). More recently, Martínez-Pérez et al. (2024) extended this conclusion to the attentional domain, demonstrating in an attentional blink task that the self-prioritization advantage for a self-associated over a friend- or a stranger-associated shape persisted even after familiarity with the shape-label associations was equated through additional shape-label matching training prior to the attentional blink task.

Whether this evidence for self-specificity in the SPE paradigm extends to the iSRE, however, remains an open question. Unlike the SPE paradigm that relies on minimal, experimentally induced self-associations, the iSRE is typically studied using naturally occurring self-relevant cues such as one's own name or face linked to richly elaborated, autobiographically grounded self-knowledge. It is therefore unclear whether evidence for self-specificity obtained in the former context generalizes to the latter. Moreover, the SPE literature has focused primarily on perceptual and attentional processing, whereas the iSRE concerns incidental memory. This distinction is important because emerging evidence suggests that self-prioritization effects are not isomorphic across cognitive domains. For example, self-biases in perception and attention are uncorrelated or at best only weakly correlated (Nijhof et al., 2020; Amodeo et al., 2021; Martínez-Pérez et al., 2024), and self-biases in perception and memory (measured via the eSRE paradigm) are similarly uncorrelated (Amodeo et al., 2021). Self-biases in attention and the eSRE specifically, however, appear to follow a different pattern, a point we revisit in the context of the eSRE literature below.

The role of familiarity has also been examined in the context of the eSRE by using one's close other as a comparison focus (e.g., Amodeo et al., 2021; Amodeo et al., 2026; see also Symons & Johnson, 1997, for a meta-analytic review showing a memory advantage for self-reference over reference to a familiar, intimate other), and the magnitude of the eSRE has been found to be positively correlated with an attentional self-bias (Amodeo et al., 2021). However, the eSRE and iSRE are thought to arise from distinct underlying mechanisms (enhanced elaboration and organization of incoming stimuli scaffolded by the rich body of self-knowledge vs. relatively more low-level attentional responses to self-cues). Support for this mechanistic distinction comes from the finding that the two effects follow different developmental trajectories, with the eSRE exceeding the iSRE in magnitude only from around age 8 onward (Hutchison et al., 2021). Accordingly, neither the self-specificity of the eSRE nor its link to an attentional self-bias can be assumed to extend to the iSRE.

Taken together, these findings suggest that self-prioritization in different cognitive domains, or even different forms of self-related memory advantages, may reflect at least partially distinct processes rather than a single unitary mechanism. As such, evidence for self-specificity in perceptual, attentional, or explicit self-referential memory tasks does not necessarily imply that incidental self-memory advantages are driven by the same mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has directly addressed the self-specificity of the iSRE, leaving open the question of whether it reflects a genuinely *self-related* memory advantage. Establishing whether the iSRE reflects self-specificity is a necessary first step toward understanding the proximate mechanisms that give rise to this memory advantage, carrying implications for not only theoretical accounts of how the self spontaneously influences cognition and memory but also for broader practical applications.

The goal of the present study was to test the self-specificity of the iSRE. To this end, and in line with prior work on the debated role of familiarity in preferential self-processing (e.g., Amodeo et al., 2023; Bortolon & Raffard, 2018; Fan et al., 2013; Nijhof et al., 2020; Tacikowski et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2013), we included a highly familiar, personally close other (one's best friend) as an additional non-self referent to examine if and how the magnitude of the iSRE would be modulated by differences in self-specificity and familiarity across referent conditions. During incidental encoding, participants judged the spatial location of each target word relative to a centrally presented referent cue (their own name, their best friend's name, or a stranger's name). Participants' memory for the target words was then assessed in a surprise recognition test. Participants also provided subjective ratings of the familiarity and self-relevance of each referent.

We hypothesized that if the iSRE is self-specific, memory for target words would be better when they were incidentally paired with the self than with a close other, because the inclusion of a highly familiar, personally known close-other referent controls for the potential confound of familiarity. In contrast, if the iSRE is primarily driven by familiarity, memory performance should not differ significantly between words that were paired with the self and those paired with a close other. Memory for words paired with the stranger was expected to be poorer than memory for words paired with either the self or the close other, as the latter two referents are both more self-relevant and more familiar to the participants.

Method

Participants and Experimental Design

The participants were 126 undergraduate students (82 female; mean age = 18.57 [*SD* =

1.08] years). All participants were primary speakers of English and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal color perception. The sample size was determined a priori using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007), based on an effect size slightly lower than the small-to-medium effect sizes previously reported for the incidental SRE (*dz* = 0.44 – 0.53; Kim et al., 2018, 2019; Turk et al., 2008); f = 0.15, $\alpha = .05$ [two-tailed], power = 0.95, minimum required $n = 116$). Informed consent was obtained from each participant in accordance with local institutional review board guidelines, and participants received course credit in return for their participation. Data from four participants were excluded from analyses due to poor performance on the encoding task, defined as overall accuracy below 50% (chance performance on the two-alternative forced-choice spatial judgment task). The final sample included 122 participants.

The experiment used a single-factor design with Cue Referent (Self, Friend, or Stranger) as a within-subjects factor.

Materials

Word Stimuli

A total of 128 personality-trait adjectives (e.g., *honest*, *outspoken*) taken from Anderson (1968) were divided into four lists of 32 words each that were matched for likeability and meaningfulness based on Anderson's (1968) norms as well as for word length and syllable length, all Fs ≤ 0.82, all ps $\geq .48$, all BF_{10}s ≤ 0.11. All selected words were drawn from the positive end of Anderson's (1968) likability spectrum, with likability values exceeding the normative median (*Mdn* = 266, out of a full range of 26–573). The first three lists served as critical items that were presented in the encoding phase (i.e., "old" items). The assignment of these critical lists to the Self, Friend, or Stranger condition was counterbalanced across participants. During encoding, a random half of the critical words in each Cue Referent condition were presented above the respective name, and the other half were presented below the name. The remaining list served as "new" items in the subsequent memory test.

Cue Stimuli

The cue stimuli consisted of each participant's own first name (i.e., self name), the first name of the participant's best friend (i.e., friend name) of the same gender as the participant, and the gender-matched first name of an unknown person (i.e., stranger name). At the start of the experiment, participants were first asked to provide their own name and the name of their best friend, by entering each name into a respective text box shown on the screen. Then, they were shown a list of 50 common, gender-matched first names that had the same number of letters as their own first name that were drawn from the U.S. Social Security Administration list of the popular female and male first names given to babies in the years between 1960 and 2020 (https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/). The participants were asked to mark off any name if someone they knew had the same first name or if that name was their own first name. Among the names that were not marked by the participants (i.e., the names that were not used by anyone the participants knew), a name was randomly selected to serve as the stranger name. The number of letters in the names did not significantly differ across the Cue Referent conditions, $F(2, 242) = 2.07$, $p = .13$, $BF_{10} = 0.20$.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted online on a custom-made website in a single session. Participants first provided informed consent electronically. Then, they were guided through each phase of the experiment with verbal instructions read by an experimenter via Zoom video conferencing software. The experiment had the following two phases:

Encoding

Each trial began with a cue (i.e., the self name, the friend name, or the stranger name) presented in the center of the screen in black capital letters (in 52-point Helvetica font). Five hundred msec after the onset of the cue, a trait word was presented either above or below the cue in red lower-case letters (in 52-point Helvetica font) for 2 sec. For each trial, the participants were asked to indicate whether each word appeared above or below the cue in the middle regardless of the identity of the cue, by pressing the "A" (above) or "B" (below) key on their keyboard.[1] Participants had to respond while the word was on the screen. There was a total of 96 trials (32 trials each for the Self, Friend, and Stranger conditions) that were presented in a random order for each participant. Trials were separated by a 500-msec fixation period.

Recognition Memory Test

Immediately following the encoding phase, participants were given a surprise memory test. The 96 "old" words from the encoding phase along with 32 "new" words were presented individually in the center of the screen in black lower-case letters (in 52-point Helvetica font). For each word, participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had seen the word in the preceding phase (old/new recognition), by pressing the "O" (old) or "N" (new) key on their keyboard. Participants were allowed as much time as they needed to make their memory judgment for each word. Trials were separated by a 500-ms fixation period, and the words were presented in a random order for each participant.

After the experimental phases, participants rated each of the three cues (i.e., the self name, the friend name, and the stranger name) first for familiarity (1 = "not familiar at all" to 9 = "extremely familiar") and then for self-relevance (1 = "not relevant to me at all" to 9 = "extremely relevant to me"). Finally, the participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire in which they were asked to describe any thoughts/guesses they had about the purpose/hypothesis of the study as well as any technical difficulties they experienced during the study. No participant correctly guessed the experimental purpose/hypothesis or reported

---

[1] To examine whether the non-counterbalanced response key mapping introduced any systematic influence on recognition memory, we conducted a 3 (Cue Referent: Self, Friend, or Stranger) × 2 (Word Location: above or below) repeated-measures ANOVA on corrected hit rates. This analysis revealed no significant main or interaction effect involving Word Location, all Fs $\leq$ 2.53, all ps $\geq .11$, with substantial Bayes evidence for null effects (all $BF_{inclusion} \leq 0.27$), indicating that the response key mapping did not differentially influence recognition memory across Cue Referent conditions. $BF_{inclusion}$ quantifies the evidence for models containing a given factor relative to equivalent models without the factor.

experiencing difficulty during the study. Following completion of the self-report questionnaires, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Statistical Analyses

Data were analyzed with both the frequentist and Bayesian statistical approaches, using JASP statistical software (JASP Team, 2025, ver. 0.19.3). For both approaches, we used a one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Cue Referent (Self, Friend, or Stranger) as the factor for all our dependent variables. For frequentist analyses, the statistical significance was set at .05, and any violation of sphericity was accounted for by using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction[2]. Effect sizes are reported as partial eta-squared (η_p^2) values and Cohen's *d* values, as appropriate.

For each of the frequentist analyses performed, we report the associated Bayes factor (BF) representing the relative evidence for competing hypotheses given the observed data. BF_{10} quantifies the strength of evidence for the alternative hypothesis (H_1) over the null hypothesis (H_0), while its reverse, BF_{01} (i.e., 1/ BF_{10}) quantifies the strength of evidence for H_0 over H_1. Although BFs are continuous estimates that range from approaching zero (evidence in favor of H_0) to approaching infinity (evidence in favor of H_1), by convention, a BF value in the range 1 – 3 (1/3 – 1) provides "anecdotal" evidence, 3 – 10 (1/10 – 1/3) provides "substantial" evidence, 10 – 30 (1/30 – 1/10) provides "strong" evidence, 30 – 100 (1/100 – 1/30) provides "very strong" evidence, and a BF value > 100 (< 1/100) constitutes "extreme" evidence (Jeffreys, 1961; Wagenmakers et al., 2011). Bayesian analyses were conducted using JASP'S default "objective" priors (i.e., Cauchy prior width $r = 0.707$; Rouder et al., 2017; Rouder et al., 2009; Wagenmakers et al., 2018).

Results

Self-Report Ratings of Familiarity and Self-Relevance

For familiarity ratings, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Cue Referent, $F(1.58, 191.24) = 6145.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .98$, with extreme evidence for the effect, $BF_{10} = 2.75\times10^{+278}$. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni correction showed that the participants rated the stranger name ($M = 1.32$, $SD = 0.68$) as significantly less familiar than both the self name ($M = 8.77$, $SD = 0.57$) and the friend name ($M = 8.69$, $SD = 0.59$), all p_{bonf}s < .001, all *d*s ≥ 11.94, all $BF_{10,U}$s ≥ $3.06\times10^{+104}$. Importantly, however, familiarity ratings for the self

---

[2] Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the familiarity ratings analysis, $\chi^2(2) = 37.01$, $p < .001$, and for the self-relevance ratings analysis, $\chi^2(2) = 36.06$, $p < .001$. Accordingly, degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate for both analyses ($\varepsilon = .79$ in each case). Shapiro-Wilk tests also indicated violations of normality for both familiarity and self-relevant ratings analyses, all *W*s ≤ .903, all *ps* < .001. However, given our sample size of 122 participants, the Central Limit Theorem provides reasonable assurance that the sampling distributions of the means approximate normality, making repeated-measures ANOVAs robust to such distributional violations.

name vs. the friend name did not significantly differ, p = .40, with substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, $BF_{10,U}$ = 0.31.

For self-relevance ratings, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA also revealed a significant effect of Cue Referent, $F(1.59, 192.13) = 2674.43$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .96$, with extreme evidence for the effect, $BF_{10} = 1.84\times10^{+218}$. Post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni correction showed that each of the three Cue Referent conditions was significantly different from the others, all p_{bonf}s < .001, all ds ≥ 1.75, all $BF_{10,U}$s ≥ $5.44\times10^{+22}$. Self-relevance ratings were the highest for the self name (M = 8.93, SD = 0.28), followed by the friend name (M = 7.42, SD = 1.25), and then the stranger name (M = 1.30, SD = 0.78).

These results showing no significant difference in familiarity ratings between the Self and Friend referents but significantly higher self-relevance ratings for the Self referent than the Friend referent attest to the effectiveness of using one's best friend as a control condition for familiarity.

Encoding Task Performance

Encoding task accuracy was calculated as the proportion of trials associated with a correct judgment of a target word's location, separately for each Cue Referent condition. The mean response time was calculated based on correct trials only. One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed no significant effect of Cue Referent on encoding task accuracy (Self: M =.98, SD = .04; Friend: M = .98, SD = .03; Stranger: M = .98, SD = .04) or on response times (in msec; Self: M = 518.40, SD = 111.25; Friend: M = 521.88, SD = 117.16; Stranger: M = 520.07, SD = 111.26), all Fs < 1.0, all ps ≥ .71, with very strong evidence for null hypothesis, all BF_{10}s ≤ 0.04.

The lack of significant difference across the Cue Referent conditions in encoding task performance in both accuracy and response times indicates comparable levels of task engagement across conditions, suggesting that any recognition memory differences between the Cue Referent conditions are unlikely to result from general differences in task engagement or effort across the conditions.

Recognition Performance

Table 1 presents raw hit rates (i.e., proportion of "old" items correctly identified as old) and item false alarm rates (i.e., proportion of "new" items incorrectly identified as old). Corrected hit rates were calculated by subtracting false alarm rates from raw hit rates.

A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on corrected hit rates[3] revealed a significant effect of Cue Referent, $F(2, 242) = 25.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$, with extreme evidence for the effect, $BF_{10} = 8.901\times10^{+7}$. As shown in Figure 1, post-hoc testing using the Bonferroni

[3] A parallel set of analyses conducted on d-prime values (d') as the dependent measure yielded exactly the same pattern of the results, with a significant main effect of Cue Referent, $F(1.891, 228.759) = 20.72$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .15$, $BF_{10} = 2.506\times10^{+6}$. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons showed a significant Self (M =0.70, SD = 0.51) > Friend (M = 0.61, SD = 0.46) > Stranger (M = 0.50, SD = 0.40) ordering, all ps ≤ .015, all ds ≥ 0.19, all $BF_{10,U}$s ≥ 4.91.

correction showed that words presented with the self name (M = .24, SD = .16) were significantly better remembered than those presented with either the friend name (M = .20, SD = .15) or the stranger name (M = .16, SD = .12), all ps ≤ .003, all ds ≥ 0.25, all $BF_{10,U}$s ≥ 19.01. In addition, words presented with the friend name were better remembered than those presented with the stranger name, p < .001, d = 0.30, $BF_{10,U}$ = 255.60.

Table 1

Mean raw hit and false alarm rates (standard deviation) as a function of Cue Referent

	Referent		
	Self	Friend	Stranger
Hit	.54 (.17)	.50 (.16)	.46 (.15)
False alarm	.30 (.17)	.30 (.17)	.30 (.17)

Note. False alarm rate is duplicated across the Cue Referent conditions as there were no separate false alarm rates per each condition, given the single pool of "new" words.

Figure 1

Recognition performance as a function of Cue Referent. Colored dots represent the mean of each participant in each condition, joined by a light gray line. Box plots show the median (horizontal line) and the interquartile (25% – 75%) range, with the whiskers indicating maximum and minimum values excluding outliers. Split violin plots represent smoothed distributions.



Note. Removing the two outliers beyond the whiskers in the Self condition did not change the pattern or significance of the results.

Discussion

The present study investigated whether the iSRE is self-specific or driven by familiarity by examining memory for target words incidentally paired with three types of referent cues during encoding: the self (self-specific, highly familiar), a close other (non-self, highly familiar), and a stranger (non-self, non-familiar). Memory was better for words paired with the self than for those paired with a close other, which in turn were better recognized than words paired with a stranger. Attesting to the effectiveness of using a close other as a control for familiarity, self-report ratings of familiarity did not significantly differ between the self and close-other referents, whereas self-relevance ratings were significantly higher for the self than for the close-other referent,

Replicating and extending previous work on the iSRE (Andrews et al., 2020; Cunningham et al., 2014; Hutchison et al., 2021; Kim et al., 2018, 2019; Ross et al., 2020; Turk et al., 2008; Wong et al., 2024), the present study provides the first empirical evidence that the iSRE is primarily driven by self-specificity per se rather than by heightened familiarity of self-cues.[4] In line with theoretical accounts positing a prioritized status of the self during information processing (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Sui & Humphreys, 2015; Sui & Rotshtein, 2019; see also Golubickis & Macrae, 2023), our findings suggest that self-cues may spontaneously recruit processing mechanisms/resources that enhance memory encoding, even in the absence of explicit self-referential or evaluative task demands. Notably, memory was better for words paired with a close other than for those paired with a stranger. Because close-other referents were rated as both more self-relevant and more familiar than stranger referents, this incidental "friend effect" could be attributed to either factor. However, our findings of a memory advantage for self-paired words over close-other-paired words despite no significant differences in perceived familiarity between these two referents, provides compelling evidence that self-specificity critically contributes to the iSRE beyond familiarity alone.

The present findings add to a growing body of evidence that self-processing advantages reflect genuine self-specificity rather than mere familiarity with self-relevant stimuli. Previous work using the SPE paradigm has demonstrated self-specificity in perceptual matching (Golubickis et al., 2020; Sui et al., 2012; Sui et al., 2013; Woźniak & Knoblich, 2019) and attentional processing (Martínez-Pérez et al., 2024) using arbitrary, experimentally induced self-associations. The present study shows that a similar conclusion holds for self-memory advantages arising in a non-evaluative, non-self-referential task context when self-relevance is conveyed by naturally occurring cues with longstanding personal significance. This extension is particularly informative, given emerging evidence that self-prioritization effects across cognitive domains are not expressions of a common underlying process (Nijhof et al., 2020; Amodeo et al., 2021; Martínez-Pérez et al., 2024). Rather than reflecting a single unitary mechanism, self-biases in perception, attention, and memory may be at least partly dissociable, such that self-specificity

[4] A subsequent collaborative study replicates and extends the present findings to source memory and examines semantic processing as a potential mechanism of the iSRE (Paff et al., 2026).

within each domain warrants independent empirical examination.

The present findings also have implications for understanding the relationship between the iSRE and the eSRE. Although previous work has examined the role of familiarity in the eSRE (Amodeo et al., 2021; Amodeo et al., 2026) and shown that self-referential memory advantages extend beyond familiarity with a close other, it remained unclear whether the same would hold for the iSRE. This question is particularly relevant because the two effects are thought to rely on at least partially distinct mechanisms (with the eSRE attributed to elaborative, self-knowledge-based processing and the iSRE proposed to rely on relatively more low-level attentional responses to self-cues) and follow different developmental trajectories (Hutchison et al., 2021). The present results show that the iSRE, like the eSRE, reflects genuine self-specificity rather than mere familiarity. This convergence raises the possibility that self-specificity may be a common feature of self-related memory advantages, even if the mechanisms that support those advantages differ. Notably, Amodeo et al. (2021) found that the magnitude of the eSRE was positively associated with an attentional self-bias, raising the possibility that these two forms of self-related memory advantage may be more closely related than their differing developmental trajectories would suggest. Directly comparing the iSRE and eSRE within the same sample and examining whether the magnitudes of their respective Self > Close Other advantages are correlated could help clarify the extent to which they rely on shared vs. distinct processes.

Although the present findings are consistent with previous studies supporting attentional prioritization of the self over a close other (e.g., Amodeo et al., 2021; Fan et al., 2013; Nijhof et al., 2020; Nowicka et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2013), empirical evidence in this area have been largely mixed. Focusing specifically on self-name processing in line with our use of the names as referent cues (for prioritized self-face processing, see Bortolon & Raffard, 2018), some studies showed preferential processing of one's own name vs. close other's name. For instance, using a visual search task combined with an eye-tracking measure, Yang et al. (2013) found faster detection of one's own name compared to a close other's (i.e., one's mother) or celebrity's name, along with faster initial fixation to and fewer saccades away from one's own name. Similarly, using event-related potentials (ERPs), Fan et al. (2013) showed that one's own name, compared to a close other's (i.e., one's father), elicited larger amplitudes in attention-related ERP components (i.e., P2, P3) in an oddball detection task in which names served as non-oddball distractors. In contrast, other studies found no evidence for preferential processing of one's own name over a close other's. For example, Tacikowski et al. (2014) reported no significant amplitude differences between one's own name and the name of a close other (freely chosen by participants) within the same attention-related ERP components reported in Fan et al. (2013) when participants categorized names as familiar or unfamiliar. Similarly, Amodeo et al. (2023) found no evidence for preferential attentional responses to one's own name vs. a close other's name (one's best friend) across two widely used attention paradigms: In the repetition blindness task, although overall detection accuracy was higher for one's own vs. a close other's name, the critical measure of attentional self-bias (i.e., whether the repetition-blindness effect itself was reduced for the self vs. close other) was not significant. Likewise, no self-specific bias was observed in the emotional Stroop task.

Taken together, these mixed findings suggest that prioritized attentional processing of self-related information may depend critically on important boundary conditions related to the specific paradigms or tasks employed, and the present findings provide an opportunity to consider what those conditions might be. One possibility concerns whether the self and close other are embedded within a shared response or categorical structure. In Tacikowski et al. (2014), both one's own and close other's names were classified as "familiar," and in Amodeo et al.'s (2023) repetition blindness task, both names served as equivalent "critical" items. Grouping the self and close-other in this way may attenuate spontaneous self-specific effects that would otherwise be detectable. This interpretation is consistent with Yang et al. (2013), in which each name served as a distinct, separate search target rather than as a member of a shared category, and a robust self-specific advantage was observed (see also Amodeo et al., 2021). Similarly, in the present study and in Fan et al.'s (2013) oddball paradigm, the referent names were never categorized or responded to, and therefore there was little or no shared response or categorical structure to attenuate a self-specific advantage.

Another possibility is that paradigms such as repetition blindness (Amodeo et al., 2023) and explicit familiarity judgments (Tacikowski et al., 2014) require participants to evaluate a stimulus against another stimulus or trial (e.g., whether a name is a repeat of a previously presented item) or an internal criterion (e.g., whether a name feels familiar enough to be categorized as such), potentially introducing comparison or discrimination processes that may obscure more subtle self-specific effects. In contrast, in Yang et al.'s (2013) visual search task and Fan et al.'s (2013) oddball paradigm, the names were never themselves the focus of such comparison or discrimination judgments, and both studies found robust self-specific advantages. Likewise, in the present study, the names were incidental to the task and required no comparison or discrimination. It should be noted, however, that neither of these two accounts readily explains the absence of self-prioritization in Amodeo et al.'s (2023) emotional Stroop task, in which the names were neither assigned to a shared response category nor the focus of any comparison or discrimination judgment. We offer both accounts tentatively. Future studies that systematically manipulate these task characteristics within a single paradigm, while also considering characteristics of the close other (e.g., relational closeness, emotional attachment), will be needed to determine which factors, if any, give rise to the differing patterns of findings across studies and to better define the boundary conditions of prioritized self-processing. An important next step will also be to establish a direct link between prioritized processing of self-cues and the magnitude of the iSRE, as the proposal that attentional mechanisms underlie the iSRE currently rests on indirect, inferential evidence rather than direct empirical tests.

Beyond establishing the role of self-specificity for the emergence of the iSRE, an important question concerns the proximate mechanisms responsible for this spontaneous self-memory advantage. Some insight into potential mechanisms can be gleaned from previous work on another non-evaluative, non-self-referential self-memory advantage: the mere ownership effect (MOE; Cunningham et al., 2008; Englert & Wentura, 2016; van den Bos et al., 2010) referring to a memory advantage for target items arbitrarily assigned temporary, imaginary ownership to oneself compared to items assigned to another person (e.g., a fictitious person or the experimenter). Investigating the mechanisms underlying the MOE, Englert and Wentura (2016) demonstrated across a series of experiments that this self-memory advantage is likely supported by semantic organization of incoming stimuli into 'me/mine' vs. 'not me/mine' categories rather than semantic elaboration of the stimuli. Specifically, they reported no significant differences in response times when assessing the meaning of the self-owned vs. other-owned items in a semantic matching task, suggesting that self-owned items were unlikely to have received greater elaborative processing. In addition, the MOE was abolished for meaningless pseudo-objects and when the imaginary ownership task was preceded by a semantic categorization task (*natural* vs. *artificial* objects) but not by a perceptual categorization task (*green* vs. *purple* objects). Moreover, participants' responses during free recall showed greater clustering of self-owned compared to other-owned items. Of note, despite the shared feature that both the iSRE and the MOE arise in the absence of explicit demands for self-evaluation/reflection, the two effects have an important difference. In the iSRE paradigm, the self- or other-relevance of the cues is purely incidental and completely irrelevant to the task at hand. In contrast, in the imagined ownership task, self- or other-relevance is a central task dimension as participants assign objects into self-owned vs. other-owned categories. Whether the iSRE is similarly supported by semantic organization of incoming stimuli into 'me' vs. 'not me' categories therefore remains an important open question for future research. Examining clustering of self-, friend-, and stranger-paired words during free recall, as has been done for the MOE (Englert & Wentura, 2016), could offer a useful first step toward evaluating this possibility.

Another important question for future research concerns the boundaries of "self-specificity." According to the self-expansion/extension frameworks (Aron et al., 2001; Belk, 1988), one's self can extend beyond its physical boundaries to include other individuals, and even objects, that are central to one's identity and life narrative. Indeed, Aron et al. (1992) proposed that people incorporate close others into their self-concept, treating their resources, perspectives, and identities as part of their own. If participants in the present study varied in the degree to which they included their best friend in their self-concept, this could have modulated the magnitude of the iSRE. More broadly, the iSRE may be more appropriately characterized as driven by the broader construct of self-relevance or personal significance rather than by self-specificity narrowly defined as whether a cue pertains to the objective representation of oneself (e.g., one's name or face). In line with this view are the findings of Jeon et al. (2021, Experiments 1 and 2) showing that ingroup-relevance rather than cue familiarity underlies the incidental group-reference effect (iGRE). In their study, using a minimal groups paradigm, participants were first assigned to a "yellow" group or a "blue" group ostensibly based on their performance on an arbitrary perceptual task. Then, during incidental encoding, target words appeared above or below a yellow- or blue-colored rectangle serving as an ingroup- or outgroup-relevant cue depending on participants' group assignment. A subsequent memory test revealed better memory for words paired with the ingroup-relevant cue than for those paired with the outgroup-relevant cue. Because the cues were not self-specific in the strict sense and basic colors such as yellow and blue are unlikely to differ in pre-experimental familiarity, these findings support the view that broadly defined self-relevance, rather than narrowly defined self-specificity or familiarity, may be a key driving factor for incidental self-related memory advantages.

A boundary condition of the present findings involves the valence of the to-be-remembered stimuli. In the present study, all target words were drawn from the positive end of Anderson's (1968) likability spectrum, with all words falling above the normative median. Consequently, it remains an open question whether the same Self > Friend > Stranger memory pattern would be observed for neutral or negatively valenced words. This is an important question given previous findings showing stronger self-processing advantages for positive stimuli than for negative or neutral stimuli (e.g., in perceptual matching: Hu et al., 2020; Mou & Ding, 2026; in recall-based measures of the eSRE: D'Argembeau et al., 2005 [Experiment 1]; Sedikides & Green, 2000), likely reflecting a general positivity bias in self-processing (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Mezulis et al., 2004; Zell et al., 2020). Future work that systematically varies stimulus valence could help determine whether the observed memory advantage for self-paired words and the self-specificity underlying it generalizes across the full range of stimulus valence.

Another limitation of the present study relates to the near-ceiling encoding task accuracy observed across all three Cue Referent conditions ($M \approx .98$). Although this high level of performance is unsurprising given the simple and undemanding nature of the spatial judgment task, it also suggests that the encoding task lacked sufficient sensitivity to detect potential differences in online processing across conditions. Thus, the absence of condition-wise differences in encoding performance indicates comparable task engagement across conditions but cannot serve as evidence of the absence of differential encoding processes more broadly. One might specifically ask why encoding task response times did not differ across conditions if preferential attentional responses to self-relevant cues contributes to the iSRE. We suggest two non-mutually exclusive possibilities. First, attentional prioritization of self-relevant cues may operate at a level sufficient to enhance encoding of co-presented target words, without measurably affecting performance on the concurrent spatial judgment task, which required only a relatively coarse above/below discrimination. Second, attentional capture may occur during the earliest moments of cue onset, before the target word appears, such that its effects manifest in downstream memory rather than in concurrent task performance. We acknowledge, however, that both interpretations remain speculative in the absence of direct attentional measures. By using more sensitive online measures of encoding (e.g., eye-tracking, electrophysiological indices), future studies could examine whether and how self-relevant cues differentially influence encoding processes.

In summary, by showing enhanced memory for target words incidentally paired with the self vs. a highly familiar close other, the present study provides compelling empirical evidence that self-specificity (or more broadly, self-relevance) rather than mere familiarity with self-relevant cues plays a critical role in producing the iSRE. Further delineating the mechanisms and boundary conditions of this spontaneous self-memory advantage will advance our understanding of how the self shapes information processing in everyday experience.

References

Alexopoulos, T., Muller, D., Ric, F., & Marendaz, C. (2012). I, me, mine: Automatic attentional capture by self-related stimuli. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *42*(6), 770-779. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1882

Alicke, M. D., & Sedikides, C. (2009). Self-enhancement and self-protection: What they are and what they do. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *20*(1), 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280802613866

Amodeo, L., Nijhof, A. D., Brass, M., & Wiersema, J. R. (2023). The relevance of familiarity in the context of self-related information processing. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *76*(12), 2823-2836. https://doi.org/10.1177/17470218231154884

Amodeo, L., Nijhof, A. D., Williams, D. M., & Wiersema, J. R. (2026). Self-Bias and self-related mentalizing are unaltered in adolescents with autism. *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders*, *56*, 2339-2353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-024-06705-8

Amodeo, L., Wiersema, J. R., Brass, M., & Nijhof, A. D. (2021). A comparison of self-bias measures across cognitive domains. *BMC Psychology*, 9, *Article* 132. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-021-00639-x

Anderson, N. H. (1968). Likableness ratings of 555 personality trait words. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *9*(3), 272-279. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0025907

Andrews, G., Murphy, K., & Dunbar, M. (2020). Self-referent encoding facilitates memory binding in young children: New insights into the self-reference effect in memory development. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, *198*, Article 104919. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104919

Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Norman, C. (2001). Self-expansion model of motivation and cognition in close relationships and beyond. In G. J. O. Fletcher & M. S. Clark (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Interpersonal processes* (pp. 478-501). Blackwell.

Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*(4), 596-612. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596

Bargh, J. A. (1982). Attention and automaticity in the processing of self-relevant information. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *43*(3), 425-436. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.43.3.425

Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. *Journal of Consumer Research*, *15*(2), 139-168. https://doi.org/10.1086/209154

Bortolon, C., & Raffard, S. (2018). Self-face advantage over familiar and unfamiliar faces: A three-level meta-analytic approach. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, *25*(4), 1287-1300. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-018-1487-9

Cloutier, J., & Macrae, C. N. (2008). The feeling of choosing: Self-involvement and the cognitive status of things past. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *17*(1), 125-135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.010

Conway, M. A., & Dewhurst, S. A. (1995). The self and recollective experience. *Applied*

Cognitive Psychology, *9*(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2350090102

Cunningham, S. J., Brebner, J. L., Quinn, F., & Turk, D. J. (2014). The self-reference effect on memory in early childhood. *Child Development*, *85*(2), 808-823. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12144

Cunningham, S. J., Turk, D. J., MacDonald, L. M., & Macrae, C. N. (2008). Yours or mine? Ownership and memory. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *17*(1), 312-318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.003

D'Argembeau, A., Comblain, C., & Van der Linden, M. (2005). Affective valence and the self-reference effect: Influence of retrieval conditions. *British Journal of Psychology*, *96*(4), 457-466. https://doi.org/10.1348/000712605X53218

Englert, J., & Wentura, D. (2016). How "mere" is the mere ownership effect in memory? Evidence for semantic organization processes. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *46*, 71-78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.09.007

Fan, W., Chen, J., Wang, X.-Y., Cai, R., Tan, Q., Chen, Y., Yang, Q., Zhang, S., Wu, Y., Yang, Z., Wang, X.-A., & Zhong, Y. (2013). Electrophysiological correlation of the degree of self-reference effect. *PLoS One*, *8*(12), Article e80289. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0080289

Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behavior Research Methods*, *39*, 175-191. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146

Golubickis, M., Falbén, J. K., Ho, N. S. P., Sui, J., Cunningham, W. A., & Neil Macrae, C. (2020). Parts of me: Identity-relevance moderates self-prioritization. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *77*, 102848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.102848

Golubickis, M., & Macrae, C. N. (2023). Self-prioritization reconsidered: Scrutinizing three claims. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *18*(4), 876-886. https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221131273

Gray, H. M., Ambady, N., Lowenthal, W. T., & Deldin, P. (2004). P300 as an index of attention to self-relevant stimuli. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *40*(2), 216-224. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00092-1

Gronau, N., Cohen, A., & Ben-Shakhar, G. (2003). Dissociations of personally significant and task-relevant distractors inside and outside the focus of attention: A combined behavioral and psychophysiological study. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *132*(4), 512-529. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.132.4.512

Hu, C.-P., Lan, Y., Macrae, C. N., & Sui, J. (2020). Good me bad me: Prioritization of the good-self during perceptual decision-making. *Collabra: Psychology*, *6*(1), Article 20. https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.301

Humphreys, G. W., & Sui, J. (2015). Attentional control and the self: The Self-Attention Network (SAN). *Cognitive Neuroscience*, *7*(1-4), 5-17. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2015.1044427

Hutchison, J., Ross, J., & Cunningham, S. J. (2021). Development of evaluative and incidental self-reference effects in childhood. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, *210*, Article 105197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105197

JASP Team (2025). *JASP* (Version 0.19.3). [Computer software]. https://jasp-stats.org

Jeffreys, H. (1961). *Theory of probability* (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Jeon, Y. A., Banquer, A. M., Navangul, A. S., & Kim, K. (2021). Social group membership and an incidental ingroup-memory advantage. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *74*(1), 166-178. https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021820948721

Kawahara, J., & Yamada, Y. (2004). Does one's name attract visual attention? *Visual Cognition*, *11*(8), 997-1017. https://doi.org/10.1080/13506280444000049a

Keenan, J. M., Golding, J. M., & Brown, P. (1992). Factors controlling the advantage of self-reference over other-reference. Social Cognition, 10(1), 79–94. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1992.10.1.79

Kim, K., Jeon, Y. A., Banquer, A. M., & Rothschild, D. J. (2018). Conscious awareness of self-relevant information is necessary for an incidental self-memory advantage. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *65*, 228-239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.09.004

Kim, K., Johnson, J. D., Rothschild, D. J., & Johnson, M. K. (2019). Merely presenting one's own name along with target items is insufficient to produce a memory advantage for the items: A critical role of relational processing. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, *26*, 360-366. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-018-1515-9

Klein. S. B., & Loftus, J. (1988). The nature of self-referent encoding: The contributions of elaborative and organizational processes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*(1), 5-11. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.1.5

Kuiper, N. A., & Rogers, T. E. (1979). Encoding of personal information: Self-other differences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *37*(4), 499-514. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.4.499

Martínez-Pérez, V., Sandoval-Lentisco, A., Tortajada, M., Palmero, L. B., Campoy, G., & Fuentes, L. J. (2024). Self-prioritization effect in the attentional blink paradigm: Attention-based or familiarity-based effect? *Consciousness and Cognition*, *117*, Article 103607. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2023.103607

Mezulis, A. H., Abramson, L. Y., Hyde, J. S., & Hankin, B. L. (2004). Is there a universal positivity bias in attributions? A meta-analytic review of individual, developmental, and cultural differences in the self-serving attributional bias. *Psychological Bulletin*, *130*(5), 711-747. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.5.711

Moray, N. (1959). Attention in dichotic listening: Affective cues and the influence of instructions. *The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *11*, 56-60. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470215908416289

Mou, Y., & Ding, H. (2026). Prioritization of self-associated voices is enhanced by positive prosodic valence: Roles of individual explicit self-esteem in self-bias and positive self-bias. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *139*, Article 103995. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2026.103995

Nijhof, A. D., Shapiro, K. L., Catmur, C., & Bird, G. (2020). No evidence for a common self-bias across cognitive domains. *Cognition*, *197*, Article 104186. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104186

Nowicka, A., Cygan, H. B., Tacikowski, P., & Ostaszewski, P. (2016). Name recognition in autism: EEG evidence of altered patterns of brain activity and connectivity. *Molecular Autism*, *7*(1), Article 38. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13229-016-0102-z

Paff, H. A., Kim, K., Ross, J., Mathews, N., & Kritkikos, A. (2026). Semantic knowledge of words is necessary to produce an incidental self-reference effect. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, *33*, Article 121. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-026-02901-y

Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N. A., & Kirker, W. S. (1977). Self-reference and the encoding of personal information. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *35*(9), 677-688. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.677

Rouder, J. N., Morey, R. D., Verhagen, J., Swagman, A. R., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2017). Bayesian analysis of factorial designs. *Psychological Methods*, *22*(2), 304-321. http://doi.org/10.1037/met0000057

Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, *16*, 225-237. http://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.2.225

Ross, J., Hutchison, J., & Cunningham, S. J. (2020). The me in memory: The role of the self in autobiographical memory development. *Child Development*, *91*(2), e299-e314. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13211

Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2000). On the self-protective nature of inconsistency-negativity management: Using the person memory paradigm to examine self-referent memory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *79*(6), 906-922. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.906

Shapiro, K. L., Caldwell, J., & Sorensen, R. E. (1997). Personal names and the attentional blink: A visual "cocktail party" effect. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance*, *23*(2), 504-514. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.23.2.504

Sui, J., He, X., & Humphreys, G. W. (2012). Perceptual effects of social salience: Evidence from self-prioritization effects on perceptual matching. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance*, *38*(5), 1105-1117. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029792

Sui, J., & Humphreys, G. W. (2015). The integrative self: How self-reference integrates perception and memory. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *19*(12), 719-728. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.015

Sui, J., Liu, M., Mevorach, C., & Humphreys, G. W. (2015). The salient self: The left intraparietal sulcus responds to social as well as perceptual-salience after self-association. *Cerebral Cortex*, *25*(4), 1060-1068. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht302

Sui, J., & Rotshtein, P. (2019). Self-prioritization and the attentional systems. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *29*, 148-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.02.010

Sui, J., Rotshtein, P., & Humphreys, G. W. (2013). Coupling social attention to the self forms a network for personal significance. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, *110*(19), 7607-7612. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1221862110

Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in memory: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *121*(3), 371-394. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.371

Tacikowski, P., Cygan, H. B., & Nowicka, A. (2014). Neural correlates of own and close-other's name recognition: ERP evidence. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, *8*, Article 194. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00194

Turk, D. J., Cunningham, S. J., & Macrae, C. N. (2008). Self-memory biases in explicit and incidental encoding of trait adjectives. *Consciousness and Cognition, 17*(3), 1040-1045. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.004

van den Bos, M., Cunningham, S. J., Conway, M. A., & Turk, D. J. (2010). Mine to remember: The impact of ownership on recollective experience. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *63*(6), 1065-1071. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470211003770938

Wagenmakers, E.-J., Love, J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, J., Selker, R., Gronau, Q. F., Dropmann, D., Boutin, B., Meerhoff, F., Knight, P., Raj, A., van Kesteren, E.-J., van Doorn, J., Šmíra, M., Epskamp, S., Etz, A., Matzke, D., … Morey, R. D. (2018). Bayesian inference for psychology Part II: Example applications with JASP. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, *25*, 58-76. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1323-7

Wagenmakers, E.-J., Wetzels, R., Borsboom, D., & van der Maas, H. L. J. (2011). Why psychologists must change the way they analyze their data: The case of psi: Comment on Bem (2011). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *100*(3), 426-432. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022790

Wong, C., Navangul, A. S., Philipps, S. C., & Kim, K. (2024). The role of attention in the emergence of the evaluative and incidental self-reference effects. *Memory*, *32*(7), 935-946. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2024.2371571

Woźniak, M., & Knoblich, G. (2019). Self-prioritization of fully unfamiliar stimuli. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *72*(8), 2110-2120. https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021819832981

Yang, H., Wang, F., Gu, N., Gao, X., & Zhao, G. (2013). The cognitive advantage for one's own name is not simply familiarity: An eye-tracking study. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, *20*(6), 1176-1180. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-013-0426-z

Zell, E., Strickhouser, J. E., Sedikides, C., & Alicke, M. D. (2020). The better-than-average effect in comparative self-evaluation: A comprehensive review and meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *146*(2), 118-149. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000218